Arctic Council

LAKESIDE MODEL UNITED NATIONS | 2026

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INTRODUCTORY LETTER

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to LakeMUN 2026! My name is Lingying Shi, and along with my co-directors Naina Subherwal and Alexa Oh, we are delighted to serve as your dais for the Arctic Council (AC). In this committee, you will participate in a dynamic yet collaborative debate on one of the most pressing and complex issues facing the Arctic today, specifically "Establishing a Multilateral Arctic Investment and Development Framework."

Formally established in 1996, the Arctic Council aims to foster "cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic Indigenous Peoples and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues." The Council does not serve military security purposes. Now as the Arctic undergoes rapid transformation, the Arctic Council is more significant than ever. Accelerated climate change, technological advances, and growing global demand for critical resources have brought unprecedented international attention to Arctic territories. While these developments present opportunities for economic growth, they also raise concerns regarding environmental protection, indigenous rights, and long-term sovereignty.

As representatives of Arctic States, permanent participants, and observer states, you are tasked with negotiating a cooperative, regionally grounded framework to regulate foreign investment in Arctic territories. You will advocate for your state's interests while considering environmental responsibility and regional cooperation. Successful solutions require compromise, innovation, and a clear understanding of the Arctic's unique legal, environmental, and cultural context.

This background guide prepared by your hardworking dais team is designed to support you in these topics, offering foundational knowledge but also in-depth insight, including historical context, case studies from multiple perspectives, and current challenges. We highly encourage you to build on this foundation with your own research, as only you can be an expert on your position and stance.

Each MUN conference is a wonderful experience and serves as a place for you to grow, learn and enrich yourselves as delegates and as people. We hope that you don't just learn about the complex motivations shaping the modern world today, but also strengthen your debate skills, confidence, and leadership as delegates and individuals.

Yours truly,
Lingying Shi
Co-Director | Arctic Council (AC)
LakeMUN 2026

COMMITTEE OVERVIEW

The Arctic Council is the chief intergovernmental forum for the Arctic States, promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction on Arctic issues. It consists of the eight Arctic States (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Russian Federation, and the United States), as well as five Permanent Participants representing the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic (Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Saami Council).

In 1991, the Arctic States and Indigenous peoples signed the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), a non-binding agreement representing the Inuit, Sami, and Russian Indigenous peoples to promote environmental preservation and protection in the Arctic that later served as a precursor to the Arctic Council. Three years later, the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS) was established to represent the Indigenous Permanent Participants in the AEPS. It continues to support all six participants within the Arctic Council, which was formally established on September 19, 1996 through the Ottawa Declaration. Since then, the Arctic Council has admitted several accredited observers, including UN committees, universities, humanitarian groups, and the nations of Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, the Italian Republic,

Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Singapore, and Switzerland.

In addition to environmental protection, the Arctic Council has historically prioritized the health, well-being, and economic stability of Arctic communities and Indigenous peoples. It has played a key role in several initiatives, including formally recognizing the dangers of mercury exposure in 2000, publishing research that helped spark the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, and releasing the first circumpolar assessment on the welfare of Arctic peoples.

The majority of the Arctic Council's work occurs within six Working Groups (Arctic Contaminants Action Program; Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme; Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna; Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response; Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment; and Sustainable Development Working Group) and one standalone Expert Group (Black Carbon and Methane Expert Group), which conduct research, monitoring, and assessments and develop best practices and recommendations upon which the Arctic Council is able to make informed decisions. These decisions are made only by consensus of all eight Arctic States. Each member state appoints a Senior Arctic Official (SAO) to represent their government's interests under the instructions of their Foreign Minister. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council rotates between the Arctic States every two years; the Chair is responsible for leading the Arctic Council's work during that period. The Permanent Participants hold full consultation rights, meaning that all subjects are deliberated upon with their input. Their involvement within the Arctic Council is facilitated by the IPS. Accredited observers, while invited to join in discussions at the Working Group level, have no decision-making power whatsoever.

The main objective of the Arctic Council is to "provide means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States." Through its research, recommendations, and projects, it aims to bring together the knowledge

and resources of the Arctic States and Arctic inhabitants and Indigenous peoples, represented by the Permanent Participants, to advance sustainable development, protect the Arctic environment, and support global climate action. Major goals of the Arctic Council's current projects include monitoring Arctic climate change, conserving ecosystems and marine environments, promoting sustainable social and economic development, and strengthening communication and cooperation within the Arctic Council itself.

In the Arctic Council, delegates must cooperate with this framework in mind to establish a multilateral Arctic Investment and Development Framework, keeping in mind the core objectives of economic development, environmental protection, respect for Indigenous sovereignty, and most of all, cooperation within the Arctic Council and beyond. Good luck!

TOPIC:

Establishing a Multilateral Arctic Investment and Development Framework

TOPIC INTRODUCTION

Establishing a Multilateral Arctic Investment and Development Framework requires an understanding of how rapidly the Arctic is changing, and why those changes have drawn unprecedented interest from states, corporations, and local communities alike. Warming in the region is opening new shipping routes, extending the open-water season, and making previously inaccessible reserves of hydrocarbons, minerals, and fisheries more economically attractive. At the same time, Arctic societies are seeking capital to improve infrastructure, diversify their economies, and close development gaps, all while facing climate impacts and social challenges. This convergence of climate change, technological advances, and global demand for critical resources has transformed the Arctic from a “remote” periphery region into a focal point of international economic competition and cooperation.

However, the increase in actual and anticipated investment brings serious risks alongside opportunity. Large-scale projects in energy, mining, shipping, and tourism can damage fragile ecosystems, undermine daily life, and heighten the vulnerability of Arctic Indigenous Peoples if they proceed without robust safeguards. Many Arctic and non-Arctic actors also worry that foreign investment, especially those driven by geopolitical rivalries or state-backed entities, would erode national sovereignty, overwhelm local governance, and create security or economic dependencies. Existing national regulations vary widely, and there is no single, binding pan-Arctic regime that guides how capital should flow into the region. Arctic states lack a complete outline of how benefits should be shared or how damage should be prevented and remedied. As a result, investment decisions are often fragmented, reactive, and inconsistent with the long-term well-being of Arctic communities and ecosystems.

In response, a range of actors have begun to articulate principles and models for responsible Arctic development. Efforts such as non-binding investment protocols

and proposals for Arctic-focused financial institutions emphasize a need for community consent, environmental protection, transparency, and collaboration between public and private sectors. These initiatives, while important, remain partial and voluntary, creating critical questions about enforcement, scope, and inclusion. The Arctic Council—with its unique structure of Arctic States combined with Indigenous Permanent Participants and observer states—offers a forum to move from these scattered principles and interests toward a more coherent, regionally grounded framework. In this committee, delegates will be tasked with exploring what such a multilateral Arctic investment and development framework could look like: how it might balance economic growth with environmental stewardship, respect for Indigenous rights, and state sovereignty; how it could align national regulations with shared standards; and how it can ensure that those who live in the Arctic shape, benefit from, and help govern the investments that will define their future.

TOPIC HISTORY

The Arctic Council evolved from the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), which was announced by the eight Arctic states in 1991. The AEPS was based on a proposal by the Finnish Government to introduce an initiative to resolve Arctic-wide environmental issues. In June 1991, the AEPS, as well as a Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, was authorized by Arctic ministers at Rovaniemi, Finland. This was a political rather than legal commitment to creating a more comprehensive structure for collaboration in sustainable development. The five main objectives of the AEPS were to protect the Arctic ecosystem; to provide resources for the restoration of ecosystem health; to recognize and accommodate the traditional and cultural needs of the indigenous peoples; to regularly monitor and review the condition of the Arctic environment; and to identify and minimize pollution.

Although sustainable economic development is mentioned in the AEPS, its main focus was on environmental issues. With the end of the Cold War providing new opportunities for collaboration, the Arctic states were especially committed to

extending international efforts to address toxic pollution in the Russian Arctic. Within the framework of the AEPS, the Arctic states established four working groups. States, observers, and indigenous groups would provide qualified experts to aid the initiatives of these groups. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) monitored the effects of anthropogenic pollutants in the Arctic, producing reports on the status and trends of the condition of Arctic ecosystems. The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) facilitated the exchange of information and coordination of research on the flora and fauna in the Arctic, including their species and habitats. The Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) worked to develop a framework for cooperation in responding to environmental emergencies. The Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) takes preventative measures to address marine pollution in the Arctic.

These groups produced some extremely valuable results. For example, the AMAP's comprehensive analysis of Arctic pollution issues, which was published with the fourth and final AEPS Ministerial in 1997. In addition, the CAFF's forum for scientists, conservation managers, governments, and Indigenous communities, which has aided efforts to address Arctic conservation issues since 1992. However, some states felt that the AEPS made up only a portion of the issues that Arctic states should consider regarding the region. Since the late eighties, the Canadian Government advocated for the establishment of an Arctic Council to address a range of environmental, economic development, and maritime policy issues. Canada began advocating for the transformation of the AEPS into a new international organization which would not only take over the existing AEPS programs but also respond to challenges with sustainable development. These efforts led to the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, signed at Ottawa on September 19, 1996, also known as the "Ottawa Declaration."

In 1998, the Arctic Council established the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) to focus on the human dimension of Arctic issues, supporting the health, environment, and economy of the Indigenous peoples and Arctic communities living in the area. It has participated in several environmental

interventions, including officially recognizing the dangers of mercury in 2000, publishing research that catalyzed the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, taking the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), releasing the first circumpolar assessment on the welfare of Arctic peoples, creating Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) to protect the Arctic marine environment, and creating the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan 2015-2025 to guide its actions in protecting Arctic marine and coastal ecosystems and promoting sustainable development. The Arctic Marine Strategic Plan 2015-2025 addressed short and long term issues under the scope of four goals. The goals were to improve knowledge of the Arctic marine environment, preserve ecosystem function and marine biodiversity, promote safe and sustainable use of the marine environment, and strengthen Arctic inhabitants' capacity to adapt to changes in the Arctic marine environment. In 2019, the SDWG received the Global Award of the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA).

The establishment of these policies and working groups has helped to mitigate problems with sustainable development, environmental conversation, and preservation of marine ecosystems in the Arctic. However, delegates must come together to tackle the issues with climate, technological infrastructure, and demand for natural resources that we currently face.

CURRENT SITUATION

The Arctic region is one of the major global frontiers for sustainable economic development, with estimations putting investment needs over the next 15 years at nearly one trillion USD. This means that the world is paying careful attention to the region as investment and development undergo a fundamental shift from a period of international cooperation and environmental focus to one potentially dominated by geopolitical security and strategic resource extraction.

Today, climate change is rapidly transforming the Arctic landscape, creating both new opportunities and new risks. The region is warming nearly four times faster than the global average, causing sea ice to dramatically decline over the course of the past

several decades. While this phenomenon spells out a global climate disaster, it has also opened previously inaccessible shipping routes, including the Northern Sea Route along the Russian coast and the Northwest Passage through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. These emerging routes could make shipping times between Europe and Asia up to 40% shorter than the traditional routes through the Suez Canal. As a result, global shipping companies, governments, and investors are growing increasingly interested in Arctic infrastructure, ports, and transportation corridors.

Additionally, the Arctic is rich in energy sources, ranging from everything from traditional energy sources, such as oil, coal, and gas, to clean energy sources, such as wind, hydro, solar, and geothermal, to future energy sources, such as hydrogen. Since there is no one main governing authority for the Arctic, some guidelines must be set and agreed upon to ensure the protection of the Arctic environment and the wellbeing of Arctic peoples.

At the same time, geopolitical tensions in the region have increased significantly. The Arctic holds an estimated 13% of the world's undiscovered oil reserves and 30% of its undiscovered natural gas reserves. In recent years, the Arctic States have expanded exploration efforts in the Arctic and increased their military and economic presence in the region. Russia, which holds a claim over nearly half of the Arctic coastline, has heavily invested in Arctic infrastructure, icebreakers, and energy projects. Meanwhile, NATO members have increased cooperation and security activities in response to broader geopolitical tensions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These developments have strained previously cooperative Arctic governance mechanisms even as the Arctic States fight to lay claim to the region's undiscovered energy resources, creating uncertainty about the future of coordinated Arctic policymaking. As cooperation weakens, the risk of fragmented development and competing national interests increases.

Beyond the traditional energy resources, the Arctic also holds significant potential for taking major steps towards renewable energy, as well as critical minerals needed for the global energy transition. Greenland, for instance, possesses deposits of rare earth elements and other minerals essential for renewable technologies and electronics.

Increased demand for these resources has attracted global investors and external actors, such as China and the European Union. China, having previously described itself as a "near–Arctic state," is more recently pursuing Arctic investments through its Polar Silk Road initiative, seeking access to shipping routes and resource development opportunities.

Despite these opportunities, development in the Arctic presents serious environmental and social challenges. Arctic ecosystems are extremely fragile, and oil spills, infrastructure development, and increased shipping traffic could cause long-lasting damage. Additionally, the Arctic is home to approximately four million people, including many indigenous communities, whose livelihoods depend almost entirely upon the stability of local ecosystems. Rapid industrialization without proper consultation or regulation could threaten these peoples' cultures, food security, and land rights.

Several international efforts have been initiated in an attempt to address these challenges. Arctic States have negotiated agreements on maritime safety, oil spill response, and scientific cooperation under the Arctic Council. Additionally, international environment agreements and national regulations aim to reduce environmental damage and ensure responsible resource extraction. Some governments are also pursuing sustainable investment models that balance economic development with environmental protection and Indigenous participation. However, the absence of a comprehensive multilateral investment and development framework continues to pose a major challenge. Without coordinated policies, competition among states and private actors may lead to overlapping territorial claims, environmental degradation, and unequal distribution of economic benefits. Furthermore, unregulated development could accelerate climate impacts, disrupt global shipping stability, and intensify geopolitical competition and tension in an already sensitive region.

As interest in Arctic resources and infrastructure continues to grow, the international community faces an urgent need to establish cooperative mechanisms for investment, governance, and sustainable development of the Arctic region. A multilateral Arctic investment and development framework could

help ensure that economic opportunities are balanced with environmental protection, Indigenous rights, and long-term regional stability. Without such coordination, the Arctic risks becoming a site of intensified geopolitical rivalry rather than a model for sustainable international cooperation.

BLOC POSITIONS

Bloc A: Arctic Sovereignty and Controlled Development
Canada, The Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Iceland

Members of this bloc emphasize that Arctic development should remain primarily under the authority of the Arctic States. While they recognize the economic opportunities that come with foreign investments, they are wary of indirect control and exploitation of their regions. They would favor frameworks that allow Arctic governments to maintain strong regulatory oversight over infrastructure and natural resources. States within this bloc often support sustainable development policies in accordance with their Indigenous communities. However, disputes may arise on the degree of openness toward foreign investors as well as the scale of development projects.

Bloc B: Open Development and Investment
Russian Federation, People's Republic of China, India, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Japan, United States of America

Members of this bloc approach Arctic development from the perspective of economic opportunity and expansion of global trade networks. These countries recognize the Arctic's growing importance within global supply chains and emerging shipping routes. As non-Arctic observer states, they would generally advocate for more open policies toward foreign investment along with broader participation in regard to Arctic land and resource use. While this bloc supports economic collaboration and technological investment, some may prioritize shipping routes, research, energy, or security.

Bloc C: Regulation and Sustainability
France, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Poland, Switzerland

These countries favor stronger international governance mechanisms and the establishment of common environmental standards across the Arctic region. They believe value in institutional oversight and responsibility as foundational to attempts in development and investment. Some members might highlight environmental protection, research cooperation, while other may focus on financial governance or regulatory standards

Bloc D: Welfare - Permanent Participants
Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Saami Council

These Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council represent the indigenous communities and livelihoods of those affected by this framework—their livelihoods, culture, environment, and economy. Members of this bloc strongly believe in environmental stewardship, the protection of traditional lands, and the implementation of meaningful Indigenous consultation within decision-making. These organizations stress the importance of indigenous voices, equitable distribution of economic benefits, and respect for Indigenous cultural preservation, grounded within the environment and lifestyle. As a result, members of this bloc may collaborate with state delegations that have aligned initiatives, or oppose those who disregard the potential impacts of their proposals.

CASE STUDIES

CASE STUDY A: Polar Silk Road

With the unprecedented warming of the Arctic region at around four times the rate of the rest of the world, the once frozen-over sea has opened up attractive opportunities for global trade and development. One of the most notable initiatives reflecting this trend is the Polar Silk Road (PSR), proposed by China in 2018. As part of its Arctic policy connected to the broader Belt and Road initiative, the Arctic Policy White Paper framed the PSR as a "new corridor" across the Arctic Ocean, claiming China as a "near-Arctic State" and demonstrating Chinese government interest in exploring shipping, resource development, energy projects, scientific research, and governance within the Arctic region.

A central component of the Polar SIlk Road is the development of commercial shipping along the Northern Sea Route, which runs along the northern coastline of Russia. Compared to traditional maritime routes through the volatile Suez Canal or the low waters of the Panama Route, this new trade route between Asia and Europe would significantly shorten travel distances by several hundred kilometers. As a result, both Russia and China have explored the potential for Arctic routes to become an alternative route for global trade. To test the feasibility of this route, the Chinese shipping company COSCO Shipping began experimental transits of the Northern Sea Route with ice-class vessels in the late 2010s. By 2021, COSCO conducted fourteen Arctic voyages within a single year, analyzing costs, timing, navigational risks, and scalability within the region.

Associated with the Polar Silk Road project is China's participation in various investments toward energy and scientific projects. Chinese firms and financial institutions have invested heavily in Arctic liquified natural gas (LNG) projects, buying a 20 percent equity stake in the Yamal LNG Project located on the Yamal Peninsula. Meanwhile, the Silk Road Fund and Chinese policy banks provided billions of euros in loans to support construction of liquefied natural gas infrastructure and specialized Arctic shipping vessels. Alongside energy investments, China has also pursued

technological research necessary for Arctic operations, such as ice-class LNG carriers, high-latitude satellite navigation, polar offshore infrastructure, and unmanned exploration technologies. These examples demonstrate how foreign investment can accelerate large-scale energy projects within the Arctic, but they also reveal a larger strategy for China to become deeply embedded in Arctic operations as a major stakeholder.

Diplomatically, China has framed the Arctic as a region of “global concern,” arguing that non-Arctic states should be able to participate in scientific research and resource development under international law, particularly the principles established in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Yet Chinese officials have generally avoided directly challenging the sovereignty of the Arctic states, instead pursuing bilateral partnerships and carefully expanding its presence through various cooperative projects.

However, the Polar Silk Road has raised significant environmental and ethical concerns. Increased shipping in the Arctic region elevates the risk of oil spills and carbon emissions that could result in back carbon. In addition to pollution, loud sounds and movement may disturb marine wildlife. These inevitable consequences could have a compounding effect on the acceleration of ice melting in the Arctic, emphasizing a cautious approach especially as certain environmental damages may be irreversible. Additionally, there has been heated debate on the ethical implications of these ventures. Critics speculate that without sufficient consultation of indigenous groups, the PSR would mostly benefit major foreign powers while the ecological costs are disproportionately placed onto inhabitants of the arctic.

Ultimately, the Polar Silk Road project highlights both the opportunities and the complexities of foreign investment in the Arctic and the impact of foreign agendas. While Chinese financing has allowed for infrastructure development, energy production expansion, and overall better economic development for the Arctic, these initiatives have raised questions about geopolitical influence, environmental protection, and sovereignty. As these projects continue to expand, the Polar Silk

Road illustrates the growing need for coordinated policies that balance economic opportunity with environmental responsibility and regional cooperation.

CASE STUDY B: Permanent Participants

One of the main goals for the establishment of the Arctic Council was to unite states with territory in the Arctic Circle region with major Indigenous organizations. These organizations, known as Permanent Participants, would work as equals alongside states. In 1996, the original Permanent Participants were the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (which is now known as the Inuit Circumpolar Council), the Saami Council, and the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and Far East of the Russian Federation (or the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North). Now, there are six Indigenous Peoples' organizations that have been granted Permanent Participants status in the Arctic Council. These groups are the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich'in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council.

The relationship cultivated through the Arctic Council between states and indigenous representatives is unique in diplomacy. Typically, international organizations have a category of observers, such as indigenous groups and non-governmental organizations, whose role in the meetings is to advise states, provide feedback on the proceedings, and observe the events that take place. However, the Arctic Council is different because the Permanent Participants became a vital component of the organization. It is extremely rare and distinctive for states and indigenous groups to work together as equals in the way that the nations and Permanent Participants collaborate in the Arctic Council.

The Permanent Participants guarantee that the perspectives of the Arctic Indigenous are an integral part of the operations of the Arctic Council, providing a more direct view than if states relied on consultations with Indigenous peoples for information and assistance. In addition, Permanent Participants represent a cross-section of

nationalities, which offer cross-border perspectives. For instance, the Aleut International Association (AIA) is composed of members from the United States of America and Russia. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) included participants from Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the United States of America, and Russia. Especially in the current political climate, it is crucial that we understand and advocate for the needs of all people in the Arctic region.

Projects within the Arctic Council that have been led mainly by Indigenous groups have been largely successful and continue to develop. The Gwich'in Council International currently has two projects focused on the effects of wildland fires on the boreal forests. One is with the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) Working Group and the other with the Emergency Preparedness Prevention and Response (EPPR) Working Group. Both projects were prompted by the detrimental fires in Gwich'in communities (which are north of the Arctic Circle). Since 1960, around 64% of the Yukon Flats National Wildlife Refuge, inhabited by the Gwich'in, have been burned. The CAFF project, Arctic Fire, aims to expand our comprehension of wildland fire ecology in the Arctic and distribute Indigenous knowledge on the issue. The EPPR project, Circumpolar Fire, assesses the legal frameworks of the current wildfire collaborations between Arctic States and has suggested that new sectors of agreements and cooperation might be necessary due to current Arctic wildland fires.

GUIDING QUESTIONS

- What role should Arctic and non-Arctic states play in Arctic investment?
- What mechanisms could be used to finance Arctic development?
- How can local Indigenous communities and Arctic peoples be involved in development decisions for the Arctic region?

- What governance or regulatory framework is required to ensure responsible and effective Arctic investment?

- How can Arctic development be balanced with environmental protection?

- Which sectors should be prioritized for Arctic investment?

FURTHER RESEARCH

The Arctic Council Official Website: https://arctic-council.org/

- Contains information about the structure, goals, and working groups of the Arctic Council. This source is useful for understanding how decisions are made, who participates in this process, and what policy areas the Council addresses.

The Arctic Council's Strategic Plan 2021-2030 (from the Inter-Agency Standing Committee): https://iasc.info/news/arctic-community-news/843-arctic-council-strategic-plan-2021-to-2030

- Outlines the Council's long-term priorities, including sustainable development, environmental protection, and economic cooperation. This source is a good starting point for policy goals delegates' framework could support.

The Arctic Council Governance Overview (from the World Wildlife Fund): https://www.arcticwwf.org/our-priorities/governance/arctic-council-and-national-governance/

- Explains how the Arctic is governed through both national law and multilateral cooperation, and provides useful context for delegates designing a framework that fits within existing governance structures.

2025 Economic Report on the Arctic: https://www.ssb.no/en/natur-og-miljo/miljoregnskap/artikler/the-economy-of-the-north--econor-2025/_/attachment/inline/272dc674-b6ee-44ef-85d6-7900a445123d:a2e5f3ad50def1799825100a4b86b1a167a41823/SA180_ECONOR2025_low.pdf

- A detailed Arctic economic study covering the GDP, industries, and socioeconomic indicators across the Arctic region. This study also discusses sectors like fishing, energy, mineral mining, and Indigenous livelihoods.

Arctic Economy Overview: https://www.arctictoday.com/arctic-economy-what-do-the-numbers-tell-us/

- A slightly less detailed overview of the Arctic's economy explaining the growing economic importance of the Arctic and challenges in measuring its economy. This is a helpful background for understanding investment opportunities and geopolitical interest.

Sustainable Investment Opportunities in the Arctic: https://arcticeconomiccouncil.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/sustainable-investment-opportunities-october-2022-low-res-3.pdf

- Case studies of investment projects implemented in the Arctic in the mining, energy, tourism, and technology sectors. These are useful examples of real-world economic development strategies that delegates may build off of or draw inspiration from for their own policy proposals.

The Future of Arctic Governance in a Fractured Geopolitical Landscape: https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2025/10/14/the-future-of-arctic-governance-in-a-fractured-geopolitical-landscape/

- Discuss how great-power politics (American and Russian policy, NATO expansion) affect Arctic cooperation. This source is important for delegates considering geopolitical constraints on investment frameworks and how national politics might play into their policies.

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